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I II! T ROD U C T I 0 l~ 
The concept of the core force is a basic thought of current 
Australian defence policy . Briefly speaking , this concept means 
maintenance of the relatively small forces in peacetime that would 
be expanded in case of emergency . Two notions engender this concept: 
first , there is no identifiable threat of substance ; second , there 
is a need for insurance against uncertainty . 1 There has been strong 
criticisu against this concept , involving mainly the time needed 
to expand the c o re force in case of emergency . 
According to Babbage ' s calculation : 
... in the area of army manpower , it would be necessary 
to accept that for any scenario re~uiring t~ e response 
of an Australian army larger than 150 , 000 Qen, 
between 2; to 5 years would need to be available 
from t~e ti~e of mobilization order to the commencement 
of hostilities(i . e . defenc e p r enaration time would 
- ~ 
1 be 2 2- 5 years) . Similarly, i t would need to be 
assumed t~at for any scenario l"equiring t h e response 
of an Australian arny larger than 250 , 000 me n , 
between 4 and 8 years ' d efence preparation time 
would be available . It is i mp ortant to realize that 
this defence preparation ti me wo uld only begin when 
the government perceived the existence of a specific 
threat and ordered the full - scale mobilization of 
Australia ' s resources in response . 2 
But , " t~ere is little on the threat horizon likely to arouse 
alar~ or consternation among the Australian populace within any 
~ ' fo r eseeable period of time . Thus it i s equally likely that no 
Austral i an government will allocate more than 3 per cent of gross 
I 
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national product annually to defence purposes over that period . 
This is a very practical constraint or delimitation on the development 
of force structure . ,,3 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence says , " Developing the core for c e against specific threats 
or contingencies of threat would r i sk the unacceptable distortion 
of that force to meet wbat could be the wrong t h reat , in t h e wron g 
place and at the wrong time .,, 4 Even so , there are so~e broad 
categories of contingencies wbich need to be p lanned for , a n d 
r equ i re agreed operat i onal plans by the Defence Forces . A defence 
force based UDon unclear strategic thinking might not deal adequately 
with any contingency . As long as the defence budget is limited , 
as is inevitable es~ecially in democratic countries in times of 
peace , priorities should be made clear . 
Indeed alarming develop~ents affecting national security 
or natio n al independence are not foreseen , but a variety of contingencieE 
have been identified , anyone or more of which - separately or in 
co~~i nation - could arise within the very short warning time . Therefore 
prepa ration is being , or should be , Dade now . 5 
l':hi l e almo st endl e s s cIa s si fi cation of mili tary confli cts 
has b e8D made by analysts , there would seem to be four basic typ es: 
nuclea r war , conventional war , minor harassment and insurgency . 
These types may be intermingled and , on occasion , the boundary 
lines between the last three becomedecidedly vague . 6 For Australia 
three categories of threats have come to receive explicit attention 
In 
in the 1970s . First regional/stability , second nuclear proliferation , 
th i rd peacetime a nd low - level cont i ngencies . 7 Especially , in the 
1973 and 1975 St r ategic Basis documents , low - level contingencies 
a r e the only ones specifi ed as requir i ng " forces in being ,, 8 
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As Hamilton says : 
It is to this more limit ed typ e of contingency 
that we give priority in deciding t h e develop~en t 
and readiness of forces in t he shorter term. The 
limited operations involved would require of an 
adversary less military capability , less preparation 
time and less powerful motivation than would major 
conventional attack on Australia . Moreover , it 
is in relat i,on to this type of si tuation , as distinct 
from that of global war or even major attack on 
Australia , that the need to defend ourselves 
o 
independently is least in doubt . 11/ 
As a matter of fact , the only matter with which Australia 
can deal at present is peacetime and low- level contingen cies . 
On the one hand as both nuclear proliferation and regional instability 
are big political issues themselves , political adjustment of relations h i p 
with related countries and the establishment of national consensus 
are indispensable for the promotion of suitable attitudes toward 
these issues . It is likely to require a lot of tim e to make these 
It adjustments and ach ieve consensus . On the oth er hand , the policy 
toward low - level contingencies itself is relatively feasible a n d 
~ 
I 
politically less controversial . So it is a p pro p riate to pa y priority 
to t!1is . 
~owever , sight should not be lost of higher - level threat 
contingencies . Lower - level threats carry within themselves the 
potential fo r escalation by either opponent - the aggressor ~ay 
feel compelled to escalate as a result of frustration of the low -
level attack , or the defender may perceive escalation of hostilities 
~ as the only way in which to halt it . Therefore , whatever is done 
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to lessen Australia ' s vulnerability to low - level contingencies 
should also contribute , wherever ?ossible , to its capacity to cope 
with the h i gher - level c ont i ngencies . 10 
The Jo i nt Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in referring 
to low - level contingencies said Australia may be confronted by 
one or several contingenci es of the following situations : 
(a) sporadic attacks against key civil facilities 
(b) 
( c ) 
(d) 
and installations (which are so~etimes referred 
to as vital points , as the orderly life of a 
~odern society depends on the~) for example , 
power station , petroleum refineries , water 
supplypumping stations and cODputers ; 
attacks against isolated Qilitary facilities ; 
harass~ent of our shipping , fishing activities , 
and offshore exploration and exploitation ; 
sDoradic intrusion int o Australia ' s air space 
by military aircraft or smugglers ; 
(e) mil i tary support for the illegal exploitation 
of our offshore resou rces ; 
(f) the planned introducti on of exotic diseases 
or the support of ill egal migrants or drug - runners; 
(g) harassment of our nationals or a t~reat to 
their safety in overseas countries including 
seizure of overseas property and Australian 
embassies ; 
(h) external support for dissident eleDents in , 
or mi l i tary pressures against , a regional country 
the se curity of which is important to Australia ; 
(i) co v e r t or overt overseas support for Australian 
• 
I 
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dissident or mi nority groups in Australia who 
might be encouraged to resort to terrorist 
action ; 
(j) overseas based te r rorist groups using violence 
1: or threats of violence in Australia or on 
I 
I~f' !~ .• 
an Australian aircraft ; and 
I! (k) large - scale but non - violent intrusions into 
Australia ' s proposed Sxclusive ~cono~ic Zone 
for the purpose of poaching scarce resources . 11. 
1 
.1 Among them , (a) - (e) and (11) may develop to intermediate -
II 
level threats and the boundary between low - level and intermediate -
I level is not so clear . As (g) might occur in conditions affecting 
the sovere i gnty of foreign countries , Australia should not be 
involved militarily . Althoug:l (f) , (i) and (j) belong to the category 
of cri~e and (k) is not of a violent nature , all of the~ may have 
J serious effects on Australia politically , economically or socially . 
Th e Committee has raised five examples of intermediate - level 
threa t9 , such as : 
(a) lodgements on Australian territory that are 
II limited (including in time) ; the areas that 
1 :1 
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appear to be more vulnerable as targets for 
limited lodgements would be offshore islands 
and territories as for exa~ple the Cocos Islands, 
or the Torres Strait Islands , or areas of 
northern and north - western Australia such 
as Cape York Peninsula , Arnhen Land , parts 
of t~e Kimberley or Pilbara regions and Australian 
territory in Antarctica ; 
(b) major rai ds : targets for th i s level of threat 
are more likely to be military bases , key 
.. 
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civil installations and facilities and the 
joint United States/Australian defence facilities. 
To be regarded as inter~ediate level threats, 
such raids would need to be on a continuing 
basis , or compromise seize - and - hold operations 
against major facilities or resource installations; 
(c) external aggression against a regional country , 
the security of which is highly important to 
Australia ; this would apply particularly to 
states and territories in the Indonesian/Melanesian 
archipelago and to New Zealand; 
(d) blockade of an Australian port or ports including 
by the relatively economical device of laying 
mines ; and 
(e) disruption of our lines of s~ipping co~~unications, 
or closure of a strait either in isolation or 
in the context of Western lines of communications. 
As Australian trade is important to other powers 
and is ~ostly carried in foreign ships , it 
is difficult to envisage such a contingency 
occuring exce~t as part of a ~ore general conflict. 12 
(a) and (b) presu~e an attack by an opponent on Australian 
soil . As (c) is conducted overseas , Australia night not be able 
to do anything effective militarily . Doth (d) and (e) could involve 
third countries . Australian shiDs carry only 3 % of Australia's 
exports and imports . 13 
For a high - level threat to develop against Australia, for 
example for an invasion of Australia to occur , a large degree 
of change would be required in the international political environment . 
~ 
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O'Neillsays that at least one of three ~ajor changes would be 
necessary , although not of itself sufficient, before there could 
be a major threat to Australia : 
a . The superpowers change their attitudes to each 
other to the point where one or both consider 
the risk of a serious clash to be acceotable ... 
~ 
h . Wo rld class struggle sharpens a great deal while 
at t~e sa~e time Australia conducts herself in 
a manner which is viewe~ as extremely irresponsible 
by the less privileged nations .. . 
c . Regional and great power actors acquire both a 
hig~ degree of ~ilitary capacity for aggressive 
action at long range and a high degree of strategic 
freedom to pursue selfish interests at the expense 
r> t 1 4 0.1 0 hers . 
If the change required for a high - level t h reat to Australia were 
primarily that of hostile perceptio~ and/ or intentions, a major 
threat could develop quickly . nowever, as that change is not only 
an alteration of perceptions and/or i ntentions but also requiring 
a substantial development of military capac ity , that threat cannot 
arise in a short period. As to an inte r~ediate -lev el threat to 
Australia , a lesser degree of cha~ge is required i n the international 
political environ~ent . A similar argument can be mude nou. If 
this change does not need a significant alteration of military 
I nit 
capacity but merely a change in perceptions and/or intentions , 
in some circumstances such a threat could arise very quickly .15 
4 The same thing is true of a low - level threat to Australia, for 
which a much lesser degree of change is needed - in fact a change 
Ij only in perceptions and/or intentions could be enough. A low - level 
I-
III I L 
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threat has a much shorter warning time , and the Australian standing 
force structure should therefore Dossess an adequate ready - response 
. t 16 capaCl y . 
The Co~mittee says , "Generally , the low level contingencies 
described in this part of the report are those threats which can 
be dealt with within the peaceti~e organization and structure of 
the Defence Force . 1I17 3ut the classifications of intermediate and 
low - level thjLats are essentially descriptive ones. As stated 
before , some of the low - level threats could develop to inter~ediate -
level threats relatively easily . Therefore , although there is 
no sign of a threat to Australia in the foreseeable future , it is 
desirable for Australia to be able to expand its defence force 
s~oothly in case of emergency . 
I 
'·1 
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TSCHNOLOGICAL A~D I NDUST~IAL CAPACITY 
Nowadays the potency of some eleDent of military forces 
does not depend on one c~aracteristic weapon as was the case ln 
former days, when rifles and then tanks played a significant and 
dOQinant role . It depends on a total weapons system . For example , 
a combination of surveillance , target - acquisition , warheads , guidance 
and transportation is required for a force to perforw successfully . 
Such systems have been becoming Bore and more expensive, and therefore 
nost countries can afford only smaller numbers of fewer such systems . 
Moreover , a large procurement of any particular weapons system 
or systems may seriously unbalance the defence ability of a nation . 
The possession of high technology does not of itself guarantee 
success ln a war . The introduction of high - quality weapons into 
defence forces is often predicated on the belief that they will 
save manpower . 1 This may be true but is still unforeseen , because 
the availability of such systems to adversaries raises prospects 
of high attrition rates , and because a rise in firenower of co~bat 
forces imposes heavier burdens of resupply , itself often manpower -
intensive . 11e should not underestimate the logistic costs of high-
2 technology weapons systems . 
Because there is a strict limitation on defence budgets , 
and this limita~Lon cannot be easily eliminated , all defence forces 
cannot be equipped with high - technology weapons systeQs . One of 
the dilemmas facing military planners is to what extent quantity 
can substitute for quality and vice versa . In some areas expensive 
increases to achieve greater technical excellence ~ay not only 
add little to the ability of a weapons system but ~ay actually 
be counter - productive . Larger numbers of relatively low - perforoance 
weapons systems may be more cost - effective than smaller numbers 
- 10 -
of high - perfor~ance syste~s , especially in minor harassment and/or 
. 3 lnsurgency . 
Low - level contingencies do not make heavy deoands on ~anpower . 
That of the current Australian Defence Forces is probably adequate. 
But it is doubtful whether even such s~all manpower can all be 
equipped with high - cost technology , because of the heavy requireoent 
of the Navy and Air Force for expensive advanced technology . The 
Australian Defence Forces are therefore likely to be tHo - tiered 
even In peacetime , the first tier comprising most of the Navy 
and Air Force , and a relatively small proportion of the Army equipped 
with advanced high - cost technology , the second tier the majority 
of the Army equipped with lower level technology in terms of unit 
cost , though not necessarily in terms of capacity relative to 
that of an adversary . 4 In fact in the Falklands War most of the 
weapons used in the ground fighting were not modern high - technology. 5 
Most of the high teChnology comes from overseas , although 
thr ough Australian industry participation , so~e high technology 
1{ork can be done in Australia . 6 Accordin g to 3abbage: 
... it should be noted that those countries that 
supply high - technology equi p8en ts to Australia 
can also determine , to a d egree , the nature of 
the technologies that are to b e available . 
In practice , the transfer of arms to those countries 
that do not have major defence t~eaties with the 
United States has been restricted significantly 
by the President ' s i nitiative . While this particular 
set of restrictions does not currently apply to 
Australia , it should be ~oted that the transfer 
of many advanced technologies is already being 
- 11 -
heavily constrained . It is not inconceivable that , 
in some circumstances , the United States may decide 
that it is in its own interests to restrict the 
flow of technologies and euqipments further . Alternative 
supplies might be available for most types of low 
and medium and so~e types of high - technology equipment . 
However , if Australia required access to the most 
sophisticated and advanced technologies , it is 
extremely doubtful whether these would be made 
available , either in normal times of peace or in 
. . . t t · 7 crlSlS Sl ua lons . 
Recently US resrictions on the export of high - technologies have 
been more rigidly enforced , partly because as a precaution against 
the inflow of high - technologies into the Soviet Union and partly 
because of US anxiety about the develop~ent of coopetitive high -
technology industry of Uestern ~uropean countries and Japan . The 
possibility of a lots of Australia's present advantageous position 
in this r e gard may be used as a lever with which to preserve the 
present Au stralia - US alliance . 
T~en how about local production of low - technology equipment? 
The int e rior of Australia and the jungle of P~G pose many problems 
in mobility , communications , maintenance , and human efficiency 
because of their particular mixtures of terrains and climates . 
It is desirable that low - level technology weapons be produced 
locally , as they should be specifically designed for Australian 
conditions . However , the current size of the army makes it uneconomical 
for much equipment to be produced locally , 8 and large scale expansion 
of the army would clash with budget limitations , not to mention 
Dolitical considerations . 
- 12-
There is room for doubt whether Australia can maintain 
its present industrial support capacity for national defence, 
let alone increase it in future, since many sectors of Australian 
secondary industry are at present declining. 9 For example, a Cabinet-
endorsed paper , called 'Defence Policy for Australian Industry', 
has reported that the capacity of Australia's defence factories 
and dockyards is ill-matched in important respects with Australia's 
strategic requirements, and is in need of reforD . 10 
If Australian industry is to acquire adequate defence support 
capability, a major and highly specialized expansion of the country's 
industrial capacity is essential. however , in the current econo~ic 
and national political environment , such a development appears 
unlikely . In recent years , it has in fact become clear that the 
defence support capacity of Australia's secondary industry has 
been suffering a relative decline . There are three reasons for 
this . First , the rapid growth in Australia's mining sector has 
raised the domestic costs of labour and capital to new heights 
and, as a consequence, weakened the competitive Dosition of the 
manufacturing sector . Second , the raDid industrialization in South-
East Asia , which has been successful in producing low - technology 
and high labour -i ntensive goods, and has commanded a price advantage 
as Australia's labour costs have continued to rise, is threatening 
Australia ' s secondary industry.11 Third , Australia's small population 
makes it impossible to develop a large domestic market for its 
products 12while its competitive ability in overseas markets has 
been weakened by the facts stated above. 
These tendencies do not appear to be reversible in the 
short term , if at all, and there day consequently be a further 
decline in Australia's defence support capacity. 
- 13 -
As it stands , enorBous iDproveDent in Australia's industrial 
and technological capacity cannot be envisaged . The ability to 
develop defence support capacity is constrained by political realities . 
The groHing mining industry , high labour costs , and small population 
are all factors which contribute to Australia's high standard 
of living . No government would be likely to risk depressing it 
In order to prepare for an unlikely war . And where low - level 
contingencies are concerned , t~e situation is relatively favourable 
in that adequate preparations to meet them can be made without 
sign i ficant i mpact on the standard of living . 
-14-
LOGISTICS 
Supply, t~ough relatively inconspicuous, is a determinant 
of war. Until the end of the Vietnam War , Australia had been neglecting 
the national logistic infrastructure and depending upon logistical 
support provided by its allies. More recently, since the "Defence 
of Australia" strategy replaced the "Forl.'Jard Defence" strategy, 
the appreciation has been developing that the logistic structure 
is an essential part of military operations · and that Australia 
should provide it for itself. 1 
For example, Langtry and Ball say: 
Modern armoured, mechanised, air-mobile and even 
infantry divisions in combat reqUir~Uge tonnages 
of supplies daily, and providing them in an adverse 
air and naval environment, over long distances, 
is likely to be beyond Australia's logistic capacity 
for a long time to come. 2 
In fact, transportation of Australian forces, conducted mainly 
by two C-1 30 squadrons, needed the cooperation of the civil aviation 
industry eve~ in exercise Kangaroo ' 83 which rehearsed low-level 
conti n genc i e s . This means uncertainty when facing a higher level 
threat. Fo r transportation to the ~orth Coast, there is no railway 
and the on l y sealed all weather road is the Stuart Highway from 
Alice Springs to Darwin. 
Because of the limited resources available for defence 
purpos~ utilising the existing infrastructures becomes significantly 
important. Among many infrastructures in public and private sector 
areas whic~ can be helpful in case of emergency, the aviation 
industrv is the ~ost vital one. 3 
~ 
Australia does possess a Dodern airline fleet, and its 
- 15-
transportation capability is relatively well off for low-level 
contingencies . First if civil aircraft would carry personnel, 
RAAF could concentrate upon carrying supplies and equipments. 
Second , at a low - level contingency , in Northern Australia or perhaps 
In PNG , there would not be much need for heavy equipment such 
as tanks or armoured personnel carriers , and weapons up to the 
power of an anti - tank missile can nowadays be carried by individual 
soldiers , being not much larger or heavier than a suitcase. Helicopters 
can fly from the North to PNG directly, and as it takes only two 
hours each way for an aircraft to fly between Cairns and Port 
Moresby, each aircraft can make several sorties in one day . Australia's 
difficulties in transportation would be at least matched by those 
of an invader ; for example in the event of a military conflict 
Indonesia might have to carry troops and supplies to Irian Jaya 
by sea and air , and during transit they would be vulnerable to 
attack by the RAN and RAAF . 4 
Beazley talks about defence support capacity of the aviation 
industry : 
The Department of Aviation , in supporting the industry, 
provides an integrated system of aerodromes , navigational 
aids , surveillance radar and communication facilities, 
which greatly facilitate the safe and expeditious 
movement of aircraft . . . . Ar3uably , the most important 
part of the Aviation Infrastructure is the well - trained, 
highly qualified and experienced staff that provide, 
maintain and operate the airlines , and Departmental 
facilities . ... Those components of the Aviation 
Infrastructure provide the nation with a significant 
capacity to supplement our military and civil defence 
- ! 6-
forces in tiQe s of national 
(J... 
At least as far as/lo\,l -level threat 
. 5 
emergencles . 
is concerned , aircraft 
are preferable to shipe . First aircraft are much faster than ships, 
an important factor in low - level contingencies , where usually 
both warning time and lead time are short . Second , although an 
aircraft cannot carry so much at once , the quantity of supply 
does not have to be very large . Third , ships are more vulnerable 
to interception than aircraft . 
The Department of Aviation has participated In numerous 
exercises conducted by the Defence Forces . But its main role has 
been to provide civil and military aircraft with services in order 
to ensure they could operate safely and promptly in and/or near 
the exercise area . Kangaroo ' 83 introduced a new phase . For the 
first time , the airlines participated in a exercise to carry personnel 
and equipment to the exercise area in North - West Australia , and 
the Department of Aviation participated fully in both the plannin g 
and operational phases of the exercise . This exercis e demonstra tes 
the significant capacity of the airlines to support t he Defence 
Forces in emergency situations . 6 For example : 
... QANTAS operated two Boeing 747 flights which 
transported some 780 troops complete with their 
weapons , between Townsville and Learmonth . TAA 
operated a further seven flights utilising Airbus 
A300 and Boeing 727 aircraft , to uplift some 1160 
passengers and 32 . 5 tonnes of equipment . 7 
But these figures are not representative : 
For example in the aftermath of Cyclone Tracy at 
Darwin , a QANTAS Boeing 747 aircraft , which normally 
carries a maximum of about 430 Deople , uplifted J.: _ ~ 
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680 adults and children. It can therefore be expected, 
that the s~aller aircraft of the domestic fleet 
would be able to carry corresponding numbers of 
people in proportion to their size, without exceeding 
their safe design loads . 8 
The Department of Hvi.ri.~t l· 'o . .rt provides 76 airfields a:8d has 
Q 
licensed/further 365 . 164 of them are equipped I"vi th night-landing 
facilities . 9 Furthermore , there are many farms where aircraft 
can take off and land , if necessary . 10 
Although the bigger aircraft (Boeing 747 and Airbus) can 
only use a handful of airports - in the North only Darwin, otherwise 
only five ones in the capital cities (excepting Hobart and Canberra 
- here a 747 could land , but could not take off with a load becazse 
the runway is too short) , there are various solutions for this 
problem . For example , to keep some tanks and tank landing ships 
at Darwin and fly tank crews up there if needed. Similarly APCs 
and guns . Most other military equipment will go into a C130 or 
a 747, 737 , DC - 9 or Airbus , and this might well be cheaper than 
buying more aircraft. The US does this . It has a big stockpile 
of weapons in Europe, and would fly troops the re to man them if 
1 1 
needed . 
In the North and West of Australia, wh ere low - level 
contingencies might happen if any , mining companies have large 
defence support capacity for moving earth . They have numerous 
and various vehicles suitable for road making and maintenance 
and for airfield construction and repair in times of defence emergency.12 
For example , the COMALCO - Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Li~ited-
plant , one of several medium sized companies in North Queensland, 
Dossesses an inherent capacity for road and airfield construction. 13 
- 18 -
m~is company ~as cooperated with the research of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian =~ational University . 
Of course the Defence Forces Ivould have to provide oaximum protection 
from air attack on these civilian resources , but quict construction 
of emergency airstrips would ~ake it easier for t~em to do so . 
Accumulation of resources is as imnortant as transDortation . 
~ ~ 
m~e JenartDent of De:ence has said t~at low reserve stocks of 
a~~unition , wea?ons and spare parts meant that only low - level 
operations could be supported . 1 But this ouinion also implies 
t~at Australia has enough reserve stocks for low - level operations . 
Oil is a source of energy for propulsion and ~obility for 
defence forces and will retain its important Dosit ion for a lono 
time to come . 15 Speedy says : 
!Jowadays t~e losing side l.vill be t!le one vJhic:h 
has failed to make effective arrangeDe~ts for its 
energy SUD;:)_~e8. ~~uclear pO\\Ter capabilities ",rill 
ake little or ~o difference - we are committed 
in t~e foresssable future to liquid :uels . 6 
rhe 1979 inter~at~ onal ~~l crisis Eade the Govern~ent 
establish bureaucratic oac hi~_e r~ to manage oil supplies in the 
event 0: a crisis . In late 1 o Australia took Dart i n a maior 
international exercise con~Jcted by the International ~nergy Agencv . 
_he purpose 0: this exercise was to test the ability 0: rre~ber 
countries , oil cornparies , a~d the Agency to cope with a world 
Ol~ crisis . The result 0: the test was held to indica~e tha 
_-_ustralia \-,ras \.Jell repared . 7 -- t' 1 _ .. ever ne ess , there is an alternative 
o pin ion t ha t t hat ex e r cis e y,-a s II ius taD e e tin g II and t hat Au s t r al i a 
has an inadeouate stocKuile . 8 
O l=~eill says : 
- 19 -
If wars are conducted at the intense level in future 
they will be relatively short , and consequently 
much will depend on what the belligerents have 
in stock by way of equipment and spare Darts at 
the outset . There will not be time for massive 
industrial mobilization progra~mes , and it may 
well prove difficult to import much . ~ut if a war 
becomes protracted , it is likely to continue at 
a low - level of intensity , which will still permit 
a considerable degree of international economic 
t " "t 19 ac lVl y . 
Thus , although logistic stocks of all kinds were very rapidly 
used up on the scale of the Falklands War , 20 Australia may well 
be said not to be badly prepared for low - level contingencies . 
Then how about a potential invader's supply? Here Australia 
finds itself in a particularly special and advantageous geographical 
position . The invader ' s problem is the fact that any assault on 
Australia has to cross a 200 to 2 , 000 miles water gap and be 
contested by Australian maritime strike forces . Therefore any 
invader has to provide extra resources with which to offset losses 
at sea , in order to have any prospect of an initially successful 
1 d " 21 an _lng. 
Indeed , ships have beco~e much larger and Duch faster nowadays. 
That means an i nvading force needs for fewer ships than it used 
to , and makes its transit two to th r ee times as just as in DWII . 
There are some data on the Falklands War . Britain mobilized about 
70 ships altogether to support a ground force of around 5500 . 
45 of them were merchant sh i ps?2It took 18 days fo r 5th Infantry 
Brigade to go to the Falklands (they had been brought from UK 
- 20-
to South Georgia in the QEII and transferred there to the "Canberra" 
23 to be taken to the Falklands) . I~ the course of the war four 
warships , one ~oyal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) and one ~erchant shin 
were lost ; and eight other wars~ips and two RFAs suffered varying 
degrees of da~age . 24 But Argentinian forces had no long - range 
maritime strike capability . Australia has this capability by its 
Oberon subDarines , F - 111s and Orion aircraft with Harpoon rnissiles . 25 
Nowadays , the survivability of surface s~ips has been lessened 
and the improvement of missiles and means of reconaissance has 
rendered defence more advantageous . 26 Therefore , attack , landing 
and supply across the sea has become in general more difficult . 
There are few countries which are more defensible than 
~~e 
Australia ./Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence points out : 
Leaving motives or intentions aside , there would 
be onlv two nations at nresent which have the mili~&ry 
cauabilities to mount a maior conventional assault 
against Australia . T~ese are the United States 
and the Soviet Union . he Soviet Union has a L::UC~ _ 
lesser ability to project force over sea than ths 
United States , and for a conventional ~ilitary 
invasio~ o~ Australia the Soviet Unio~ would r o i--, :::" 1 --"--'~'-- - \ 
- .. 
reQUlre an interoediate staging base in South - ~as 
Asia o provide an attac~inp force with effective 
- 0 
air cover and to keeD its shipping operational . 
0: he superpo\\Ters , -on_ the United States has 
su~ficient aircraft carriers to provide an adeoua~e 
degree of air suneriori 
o~ Australia . 27 
or a successful invasion 
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An attack against the main population centres, of the East 
is unbelievable . Such an attack would require a massive naval 
operation which would offer itself as an easy target to Australia's 
maritime strike forces . An invasion of Australia's Korth would 
need less time at sea and Australia ' s maritime strike forces might 
have fewer opportunities . But even if a landing were successful, 
an invader would certainly be confronted by major logistic problems. 28 
1"~ M -'! !'VI. ~ r I "~ It is wort~ that a relatively mobile force would requlre 
about 150 tonnes of fuel and 200 - 250 tonnes of water for each 
10 , 000 men per day . 29 It is very difficult to keep long lines 
of communication over the sea for such vast supplies. 
1'Ii thout huge preparation , Hhich is almost impossible to 
be achieved , an invader could beco~e a 'hostage ', even if successful 
In landing . As low - level threat is aimed at getting a political 
concession , there is a grave disadvantage to the invading country . 
The invader would therefore have to secure an escape route beforehand. 
A war of ' puni shment ', as the Sino - Vietnamese War , is very difficult 
to conduct over the sea . 
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DZTERREI~CE 
Paying priority to a policy of countering low - level t~reats, 
constrained by a limited budget , what concrete defence planning 
should Australia undertake? First it is required to deter a would-
be aggressor . But the relationship between deterrence and actual 
Har - fighting is most complex . As Langtry and Ball point out : 
It is an axio~ in the strategic literature that 
the criteria for deterrence and for defence are 
not only different but could even be quite incompatible 
- precisely because t~e objectives of deterrence 
and war - fighting are different . ... The strategic 
policy and associated force structure required 
to influence an adversary ' s intentions (namely 
to deter an adversary) may be quite unsuited for 
the conduct of military operations in the event 
that deterrence fails . ... Postures which can 
successfully deter orie level of contingency will 
not necessarily deter others ; and the forces necessary 
in case deterrence fails at one level will not 
necessarily be of use in the event of the failure 
of deterrence at another level . .. . the possession 
of nuclear weapons does not automatically guarantee 
1 
successful deterrence . 
But conversely speaking , if actual war - fighting is limited 
to defence purpose only , namely neither to impose one's will upon 
others nor to solve political conflict and if the level of 
contingency is limited to some extent , deterrence and defence 
could be coordinated . This i s desirable considering cost - effectiveness 
under a limited budget . Again Langtry and Ball say : 
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... An i~portant element in the theory and practice 
of deterrence is t h e concept of disproportionate 
resp onse which has been developed to provide a 
means of ensuring , in higher levels of contingency , 
that aggression will be very costly to the aggressor . 
(hopefully , so costly that military aggression 
as an opt i on of coercion against Australia is denied 
would - be enemies . ) ... Disp r oportionate response 
wi thi n the context of strategic deterrence is intended 
to progressively incorporate into the defence forces 
soecific capabilities that will cause a potential ~ -
aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms 
of the cost i n one or all , of money , ti~e , material 
and/or manpower in order to gain the advantage . 
... It is true that deterrence may fail for any 
numb e r of reasons - irrationality , miscalculation 
of t ~e costs , or acce9tance of the nilitary costs 
In order to achieve non - military strategic objectives . 
Acc e:::::t i11o this , care must be taken to ensure that 
th e con c ept of disproportionate response is not 
onl y applied in the context of deterrence but is 
also tak en into account when considering the military 
r equirements for the actual defence of Australia . 
To be cost - e f fect i ve , preparations should be suitable 
2 both for dete r rence and for actual defence . 
Low - l evel contingency is relatively more likely to happen 
than h i gh -l e v el contingency , it is true . It does not need so much 
mil i ta r y f o r ce to mount , and i f it turns out a failure , the aggressor 
count r y l~ould not be occu~ied . But even i f this were so , the failure 
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could be fatal to the government . We can see this by t he fact 
t~at the Galtieri government of Argentine collapsed after the 
Falklands War . There is the possibility that a low - level contingency 
may escalate to intermediate - level contingency . If this does happen, 
the war will be intensified. But even if a low - level contingency 
does not escalate , it may be prolonged and go to stalemate . Thus 
even a low - level contingency can be fatal to the government of 
an attacking country , at least politically and/or socially . 
Disproportionate response can therefore be applied to low - level 
contingency. 
The problem is to have a deterrent capacity suitable to 
IOH - Ievel contingency . For example , stra...tegic nuclear weapons 
do not deter low - level threats . And it is not permissible to attack 
a port overseas as a countercheck against intrusion into Australia's 
proposed Exclusive Economic Zone ; counteraction would have to 
be taken in or adjacent to the zone . As far as low - level contingency 
lS concerned , actual war - fighting capability can therefore be 
deterrence as well . 
The practical application of the concept of deterrence 
depends on not only the level of contingency which is to be deterred 
but also on the resources available and the geographical environment 
where it is to take place . 3 
There are many resources. Quantity is one of the~ . Although 
the concept of combat ratios cannot be applied in the abstract , 
the general application of the combat ratio formula is that a 
defender has a 3 :1 advantage over an aggressor in a major land 
campaign. But numerical superiority is far from the most important 
thing. There are many other factors determining relative combat 
power , called 'co mbat multipliers '. They are: particular pieces 
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of equipment , logistic support , intelligence, training and tactics, 
command and control including leadership , etc. 4 
The importance of these factors can again be illustrated 
from the recent Falklands Nar . The success of the British Task 
Force should mainly be ascribed to the quality of individual 
Servicemen . The Task Force was equipped and despatched in a re~arkably 
short time , and rarely lacked essential supplies. This showed 
the high state of readiness and training of all three Services . 5 
The most brilliant example is the battle at Goose Green , where 
an 
an 
all professional British parachute battalion of 450 men defeated 
Argentine force of 1600(mostly conscripts) . 6 
Australia does enjoy a preferable geographical environment . 
Babbage says : 
Some of the offshore islands probably could be 
assaulted and then defended by a force of one or 
two battalions . How e ver , any attempt to attack 
and hold the Pil ba ra , the northern half of the 
~orthern Territ ory or Cape York certainly would 
be a multiple- divi~~ o n operation.? 
As stated before , no country except the United States possesses 
such a capacity . If any country should seek to acquire a similar 
capability , it ahould become app ar en t to Australia well before 
the capability became operational reality . 
Babbage continues : 
The achievement of surprise , in any circumstances , 
would be a prerequisite ... , for if an assault were 
contested seriously during the initial crossing 
of the sea/ai r gap , it might fail completely . Even 
if the assaulting forces arrived at their objective 
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relatively unscathed , they still vould be vulnerable 
to continuous interdiction of their lines of 
communication and supply across the water gap . 
... Once landed on any objective along or adjacent 
to Australia ' s northern coastline , an enemy would 
be confronted with a naturally inhospitable environment. 8 
In general , then , it can be said that the larger an assault 
the ~ore difficult surprise attack and supply become . This means 
the escalation of a contingency level would be more disadvantageous 
for the attacker and ~ore advantageous for the defender, Australia. 
Hostile landing forces might be victim of a ki~d of 'territorial 
defence, . 9 
A big political risk accompanies an invasion across the 
sea . Landing and supply themselves are not easy as we have observed . 
However , wit~drawal is not easy , too . Japan in Siberia after the 
Russian Revolution , and the United States in Vietnam , found it 
difficult to withdtaw without losing their honour , but in both 
countries military operations overseas brought about fierce anti -
go\~ernment movements and social confusion at home, so that governments 
had to accept political damage rather than persevere with unpopular 
military campaigns . 
Therefore , Australia's geographical environment is the 
most powerful factor of deterrence . Even at low - level contingencies 
landing on Australian soil is troublesome and potentialy very 
dangerous project for the attacker . 
A low - level attack on Australia could take t~e for~ of 
a blockade , air attack , or invasion of some outlying islands 
rather than the mainland . These actions are in order of possibility . 
First , a blockade is indirect military action , midway between 
" '7 
I 
inactionand attack , aggressive enough to communicate firmness 
of intention , but still not so forceful as an actual military 
shot , and it places on Australia the burden of choosing the next 
step . 10 If there is to be a blockade it would probably be on the 
northern coast . The second possibil ity, an air attack , does not 
have to maintain lines of communication , nor are aircraft in mass 
as vulnerable as surface ships . Third , although landing on islands 
poses a problem of supply , it is still much safer than an attack 
on the mainland . 
This i~plies that Australia should attach importance to 
air defence , anti - surface vessel striking capability , and mine 
warfare(both anti - mine warfare and mine - laying warfare capability) . 
However this suggestion does not mean Australia may ignore ground 
forces . In order to make an opponentgive up its landing on Australia 
and to fight in PNG if necessary , maintenance of ground forces 
is required , and the capacity to transport them to remote ar eas 
- and over long distances is especially important. !his capa bili t y, 
required for defence of the mainland , should also be helpful to 
defence of the peripheral islands , PNG included . 
Although deterrence is based Dainly on the concept of 
' disproportionate response ', another aspect of deterrenc e s~ould 
not be neglected . That is 'pre-empt ion'. Langtry says : 
Perhaps the most significant lesson for Australia 
to come out of the Falkland Islands conflict is 
the disproport i onality of the cost to the British 
in failing to pre - erupt . Even if the warning signals 
were less than conclusive , it would have cost the 
British very little to have deployed pre - emptively 
a deterrent force to the Falklands with the very 
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likely result that the Argentinians would have 
called off the oneration .... Australia has a number 
~ 
of strategically important communities and facilities 
- on - shore and off - shore - which , unless a credible 
capacity for pre - emptive deployment at short notice 
can be demonstrated, are vulnerable to ' hijacking ' 
and being held to ransom for limited economic or 
. 11 political galn s. 
Although some areas may not be so important strategically, it 
could be politically damaging for one's own territory to be occupied 
by foreign force . According to "The Strategic Basis of Australian 
Defence Policy" , published by the National Times : 
In a campaign of harassment of Australia, Australian 
territories at Christmas and the Cocos Islands 
could be favoured targets .... it is iIlost improbable 
that an att e mp t would be made to seize them except 
after a nerio d of high political tension . It would 
be important that Australia recognize the warnlng 
time thus provid ed , decide whether in the circumstances 
of the tim e , co~mitment of important Australian 
military a sset s to the defence of the islands was 
12 prudent ... . 
In a low - level con~ingency, the aim of the attacker is political 
pressure rather than military destruction or territorial gain , 
the attacker seeking to demonstrate its strength and Australia's 
weakness , in order to win political concessions over some particular 
lssue in dispute. 
In future, one military exercise aimed at quick and effective 
pre - emption could be required ; even though this might cause concern 
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to neighbours, especially if conducted at Christmas or Cocos Islands, 
sucn an experience would have a considerable deterrent effect 
at least against the possibility of 'hijacking ' of some peripheral 
areas . 
• 
-~-< o -
ACTUAL WA~ FIGHTING CAPABILITY 
to 
Probably no one will object/the priority given in formulation 
of Australia's defence posture to hOldinJand destroying an invading 
force o~ the high sea and/or in the air before it reaches Australia. 
T~is means clearly that priority should be given to maritime and 
air defence forces rather t~an ground forces . 1 However at the 
initial stage of a Dossible Indonesian invasion of PNG, ground 
forces would be more important . Here we should be careful . Building 
UD of maritime and air defence forces can provide both deterrence 
and actual war fighting capability but that of ground forces may 
not provide deterrence within the context of the stated Australian 
posture . Indonesia's main fear would probably be of bombing or 
mining of main ports in the event of rlili tary conflict in P~JG , 
and the building up of Australia's ground forces ~ight indicate 
to Indonesia that Australia would not conduct such a oDeration 
at least in the first stage of a limited war. 
Langtry and Ball say : 
A through knowle dge of the significance of force 
multipliers in the tc ntical sense and their application 
to the concept of d~sp roportionate response at 
the strategic level are fundamental prerequisites 
to sound defence pla~~ing . The decision to acquire 
a specific military capacity should be influenced 
bv the extent to which it contributes to Australia's 
deterrent posture - with its significance being 
assessed as a measure of cost - effectiveness In 
terms of the disproportionate effect caused to 
? 
a potential aggressor . ~ 
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(1) Anti - Submarine Warfare Capability 
In terms of disproportionate response , anti - submarine 
warfare is less effective than submarine warfare , mining or strikes 
by surface by surface vessels . In fact , given the weakness in submarine 
forces of most regional powers , it has been suggested that Australia 
has paid more attention than necessary to anti - submarine capability . 3 
The process of anti - submarine warfare operation involves , 
first locating a submarine - like object on or in the sea by means 
of radar or sonar(search , detection) , then ascertaining that the 
object is an enemy submarine(identification) , determining the 
posit i on of the identified submarine accurately(localization of 
the position and pursuit) , and finally sinking the submarine by 
torpedoes or anti - aubmarine rockets . As submarines under water 
are concealed by the thick veil of sea water which does not transmit 
light or radar waves , sound waves are the main resource in detecting 
submarines . However , the speed at which sound travels through 
sea water varies with the place , the time of the year , and the 
depth of the sea , and there is not a sole anti - submarine weapon 
c~~able by itself of searching , identifying, locating and sinking 
a high ~roportion of submarines . Therefore , combined action by 
surface vessels , submarines , fixed wing anti - submarine aircraft 
and anti - submarine helicopters is necessitated , requiring a very 
high i nvestment of manpower and resources compared to those e~bodied 
In a subma r ine . 4 
The r e is a calculation about an adequate defence for a 
s i ngle 1,., 0 S..i..l.lP 
• 
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... a mini~um of three , preferably four , escort 
ships , two helicopters an~ one fixed wing aircraft 
would be required continuously on task . To maintain 
the necessary aircraft on task for , say , 1 - 2 weeks 
would reouire approximately 9 helicopters and 4 
fixed wing aircraft(whether sea - or land - based) . 
Increased nu~bers would be needed to maintain this 
level of defencecontinuously for longer periods . 
In addition , suitable ship platforms could be required 
for the sea - based helicopters and fixed wing aircraft . 
It does not follow that the addition of more submarines 
to t~e threat must necessarilv cause the defender 
u 
to respond in like proportions . ~or does it follow 
that the addition of a second s h ip carrying a vital 
cargo would require a doubling of escort ships , 
helicopters and aircraft . 5 
Thus we can see how difficult anti - submarine warfare is . 
Ev en th e United States cannot co~template the cost of a high level 
of ~~0+e ction of sea lines of co~munication over great distances. 6 
But for tunately for Australia , its trade is important to other 
c ount ries and 97 % of it is carried in foreign ships ; 7it is therefore 
impo ss i ble to conduct a sub~arine operatio n against Australia's 
sea lines of communication at low or even inte r mediate - level 
c ontingencies , because it could not be effective if confined to 
Australian - f l ag vessels . Therefore , the main purpose of Australia ' s 
a nti - submarine warfare should be escort of RAN surface warships 
at and/or near a conflict area . Lines of communication within 
the Australi an continent s hould be i mp ro ved , because they are 
much safer than sea route . At Kan~aroo ' 83 , for example , disembarkation o _ 
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froQ HMAS Jervis Bay was a slow process , S and the delays involved 
could lead to big losses unless t~e i~creased cost of adequate 
escort were shouldered . 
(2) ~~ine ~ ':arfare Capabili ty 
Mine warfare as a force multiplier has been considered 
as an effective way to carry out a disproportionate response . 
T~e RA~ recognizes this well , too : 
A single mine costing a few thousand dollars can 
sink a capital ship worth ~illions . The cost and 
effort to clear a port that has been ~ined - or 
even to establish that a port is clear if an enemy 
claims to have ~ined it - is totally disproportionate . 
As an exaQ~le , the cost to the US of clearing Haiphong 
harbor in the aftermath of the Vietna~ War was 
20 t ' .1-1 t' t.C>" ' t some lIDes ~ore G2a~ De cos Ol Dlnln~ l . 
'-' 
Supposing that Australia chooses to lay only one 
sub~arine load of Dines(32) off four of a~ aggressor's 
ports(eight apiece) and then declare these to be 
minefields , four mine countermeasures vessels(~ine 
hunters and sweepers) would be reouired to clear 
each port in reasonably quick time(up to a week) 
judging by Australia ' s stsndards . 9 
The cost of one submarine and 32 cines are wuch cheaDer than that 
~ 
of 16 counter~easure shivs . 
On recent types of Llines , several :TIajor nations are proDoting 
t~e research and develo~~ent of deep - sea ~ining ; a~ong these is 
a tYge which can be laid at ~eDth of over 1 , 000~ , a~~ several 
types of self - propelled ~ ines which ho~e in on surface ships a~d 
- ') L 
..J ;. -
sub~arines have 10 also been developed . I~ order to CO:1QUCt ~ine 
laying, the RAN needs, in emergenc~ situations, to define an area 
ca~able of taking the necessary awount of ~ines in a 8~OTt ~eriod, 
and then to lay t~e8 quickly. 
BesiJ~s ~ine - laying warfare , there is also anti-mine ~arfare, 
the purpose of whic~ is to re~ove or detonate gines w~ich have 
b 1 · J T"jl; een 2.lC . .!-De ~A~ ~eeds to promote efforts in research on end 
de vel 0 p ~ en t 0 f the cap a b iIi t y to CO? e tTi t ~ :J i:1 e s e s p e cia 11 y tho s e 
laid in the dea~ sea, a~~ of =ine - sweeping helicopters . It is 
elso i~~orta~t , of course, to develo~ the cs~e~ility to ~etect 
-- - - ~ 
and destrov ene~y forcas ~sfor9 t~e'T cen lav ~ines . At Kan~aroo'8~ 
u ~ ~ ~ ~ 
the mining of Cape La~bart could have ~a~ ~ serious ~9sult.11 
A t ·· f' _TI l - ~lne war~are ca"")2. '.Jili 7,,- -i S "--; c:::: ~ :::. ~ .'. -i ,.., 1 Dar t 0 ,0 t h c 'Q AN' s _ G..J.._ \-./\o..j ...... v __ u_t:::.. 1: ...L V..L .... 
- " 
e=fec~=-"Ia~e2S . 
(3; 1nti - Surfece Vessel Striking Capability 
The enhancement of anti-surface vessel strike capability 
wOvJ~ be. 
extremely effective for the defence of Australia . Recently 
the vul nerability of surface vessels has been demonstrated. In 
the ag e of PGMs and sophisticated surveillance systems the balance 
has shif ted markedly to the attacker. Strategic Survey 1982-1983 
describes: 
The array of anti - ship missiles now available creates 
a special danger for all navies . In addition to 
being relatively cheap and easy to operate, these 
missiles offer the advantages of being: 1) suitable 
for launching by aircraft, fast patrol boats and 
other means at ranges sufficient to reduce the 
vulnerability of the launching platform to attack; 
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2) likely to home in on their targets successfully, 
though this depends on the countermeasures taken 
to disrupt their guidance systems; 3) difficult 
to shoot down, owing to their flight profiles and 
high speeds; 4) able to inflict severe damage against 
d h · d· 12 mo ern wars lp eSlgns. 
Indeed in the Falklands War, British forces succeeded in 
landing on and regaining the islands, but they did enjoy favourable 
circumstances that may not exist in future. Because mainland 
Argentinian air bases were far from the British forces, Argentinian 
aircraft were able to attack from only a narrow range of directions. 
Thus British air defences were able to concentrate on certain 
directions. Surface forces operating nearer to enemy air bases 
would not enjoy such a crucial advantage. As Argentinian aircraft 
launched their few Exocets piecemeal, British surface-to-air missile 
systems never had to cope with more than one or two attacks at 
one time. If there had been more massive and co ordinated attacks, 
British forces would have suffered a much greater threat. Furthermore, 
Argentinian air attacks were not supported by the sort of electronic 
countermeasures which are designed to shorten radar detection 
ranges and disrupt the operation of defensive systems . This deereased 
the likelihood of Argentinian anti-ship missile-carrying aircraft 
reaching targets. The error in arming the Argentinian bombs, which 
resulted in numerous failure to explode on hitting their targets, 
is unlikely to recur in future . Indeed British forces were protected 
by carrier - based interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, 
and systems for disrupting enemy weapons guidance such as chaff. 
But without those rare advantageous conditions the threat to British 
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forces would have been much bigger. 13 Even in the circumstance 
of the Falklands War, out of a total of some twenty surface warships 
four were sunk and two others heavily danaged, an attrition rate 
justified in a short and decisive war, but likely to be unacceptable 
in a prolonged and inconclusive conflict. 
Modern anti-ship missiles can be greatly cost-effective. 
A something over 1 million dollars Harpoon missile can easily 
destroy a large ship costing 100 million dollars or more. Australia's 
maritime strike force has P-3-C Orions, FFG frigates, and F-111s 
all armed with Harpoons, and the cost-effectiveness of this combination 
of systems is very high. However. it would be even greater if 
w~~~ 
the FFGs equipped with helicopters (which would double the 
effective range of their Harpoons), and procurement of a suitable 
helicopter for these very expensive vessel is a matter of high 
° °t 14 prlorl y. 
At Kan ga roo'83, Harpoo n missiles were simulated frequently. 
Although they pe rformed well, three areas of difficulty - were highlighted: 
1) the target must be clearly identified. Often 
t~i s can be done on only at some risk to the P-3-C. 
2 ) Even with definite target identification, 
t here is a real risk that where there is more than 
one ship in the sea, the missile will 'lock on' 
to the wrong target. 3) Harpoon's guidance system 
does not function well within 30miles of land. 
It is, however, an excellent weapon provided it 
lS used in a blue water environment. 15 
Therefore, improvements of operation with Harpoon and joint 
operation with submarines are required. 
Surface vessels, too, have increasingly been equipped with 
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surface - to - surafce missiles and warfare between surface ships 
is changing from fighting with conventional guns t o fighting with 
shipborne surface - to - surface missiles fired at a long distance 16 
(However, experience in both Vietnam and the Falklands indicated 
the continued importance of gunfire in support of operations on 
land , the lower accuracy and destructive power of shells being 
compensated for by the relative cheapness which makes it possible 
to use them in large quantities , and the flexibility with which 
guns can switch from one target to another17 ) . 
Surface vessels can acquire defence systems against missile 
attack , but none of these systems is effective against torpedo 
attack . Australia has 6 Oberon submarines which are among the 
best conventional submarines in the world;8and as stated before, 
anti - submarine warfare is difficult . But the Oberons are now hearing 
the end of their lives , and a replacement for them is being sought . 19 
(4) Air Defence Capability 
As the vulnerability of surface vessels has become more 
prominent these days , the most probable operation that an ene my 
would resort to in a low - level contingency would be an air attack. 
In this case , too , it is desirable to be able to shoot down an 
opponent's aircraft before they can reach targets on land, and 
on the approach to a target rather than after they have attacked 
a nd perhaps destroyed it . The ability to operate interceptors 
to fairly long ranges is therefore desirable , but long - range 
inter c ept i on should not weaken the operating flexibility of the 
home - based fo r ce and not over - extend the lines of logistic 
20 
support . 
Since avionics te chnology has been advancing remarkably 
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well in recent years, aircraft performance such as cruising speed, 
rate of climb, cruising range(and hence "loiter time" awaiting 
the adversary), maneuverability and acceleration, and performance 
of airborne avionics such as radars, navigational devices or electronic 
warfare equipment have greatly improved. In addition, combat 
capability has been greatly enhanced by installing air-to-air 
and air-to - surface missiles. These capabilities make various modes 
of invasion possible such as intrusion at low altitude or very 
high altitude at high speeds while jamming or confusing radars 
which function as the eyes and ears of air defence operations, 
and implementing air-to - surface missile attacks from a long distance. 21 
Recent types of aircraft have acquired the capability to 
attack surface vessels while out of the range of the ship's 
surface-to-air missiles. Therefore the threat posed by aircraft 
t f 1 t .. . 22 o sur ace vesse s a sea lS lncreaslng. 
Missiles ar e less effective against aircraft than against 
surface vessels. Throughout the Vietnam War, a total of 1,070 
US aircraft were shot down , 80 by enemy aircraft, 150 by surface-
to-air missiles and 8~n by anti-aircraft guns. The number of aircraft 
shot down by anti-airc raft guns is outstandingly high, but must 
be related to th e low altitud~s of many US sorties and to the 
large numbers of anti-aircraft guns deployed by North Vietnam 
(for example, at one point in 1972, North Vietnam deployed 250 
Mig interceptors, 300 Soviet SA - 2 surface-to-air missiles and 
10,000 anti-aircraft guns). As far as surface-to-air missiles 
were concerned, for the whole of the Vietnam War, about 9,000 
missiles were fired against 470,000 sorties by US aircraft and 
150 aircraft were shot down . This means for the United States 
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that 0.03 % of its sorties were shot down by mi ssiles and for 
Vietnam that an average of 1.7 % of missiles launche d brought 
down an aircraft. For various years of the war the average of 
the North Vietnamese hit rate was 5 . 0 % in 1965, 0 .9 % in 1968 
and 1 . 2 % in 1972. These figures show that North Vietnam's missile 
hit rate average fell gradually as the war progressed and American 
ECMs improved . In the first phase of the Fourth Middle East War 
(October 1973), the anti - air warfare systems, including surface-
to - air missiles, of both Egypt and Syria worked very well. Over 
the Sinai peninsula Israel lost 78 aircraft in the first week 
of the war, or about 25 % of the 300 aircraft Israel operated 
In this area. Over all 114 Israeli aircraft were lost in the war, 
44 by surface - to - air missiles , 31 by anti-aircraft guns, 6 by 
either of them and 33 by other methods. In the air, however , Israel 
overwhelmed the Arabs . Israeli aircraft shot down 334 Arab aircraft, 
196 by air - to-air missiles and 138 by automatic weapons, for a 
loss of only 4 Israeli aircraft. The surface - to-air missiles of 
the Arabs, worked well at first, but could not respond adequately 
to the expansion of the fighting area because of intercept range 
limitations, vulnerability to attack from the ground and attrition 
of the system by prolonged combat use. 23 
We can conclude as follows : the technology of missiles 
has developed amazingly, but air defence efficiency is not sufficient 
with missiles only. Anti -aircraft guns and missiles should supplement 
each other. Also , in the air, the use of both missiles and automatic 
weapons is effective . 
A surface-to-air missile system has many weak points, indeed. 
First , as the role is fixed according to direction and altitude , 
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many such missiles are neecssary. In a real battlefield,many aircraft 
move in different directions. In Australian air space, owing to 
its wideness, an opponent's aircraft are able to attack from only 
a narrow range of directions. Still sufficient missiles would 
be necssary to some extent, suitable for different altitude and 
capable of being used forward and backward. Second, though not 
particular to surface - to-air missiles, wireless guidance missiles 
are likely to be useless against ECM. In June 1982 when Israel 
invaded Lebanon, 17 Syrian surface-to-air missiles sites in the 
Bekka Valley were destroyed before the Syrians were able to shoot 
down single Israeli aircraft. It is said that Israeli ECM made 
Syrian surface-to-air missiles ineffective Third, when anti-aircraft 
warfare is combined with air war surface-to-air missiles may shoot 
down friendly aircraft unless proper safeguards are adopted. In 
the Fourth Middle East War the Arabs shot down 60 of their own 
aircraft. 24 
We must calculate an air balance in terms of effective 
presence in the ai r , rather than available aircraft. For example, 
Strategic Survey 19 82 - :983 points out, in the Falklan ds War: 
The six -to-one (some would say ten-to-one) Argentine 
a dvan tage in the number of airframes was effectively 
neut r alized by a sortie rate on the part of the 
British Harriers which was at least six times higher 
per airframe. Weather aside, it appears that Argentina 
could generally mount less than one sortie per 
aircraft per day over the Falklands; at peak periods, 
Harriers could be turned around (either on the 
two carriers or on the ground) to fly six sorties 
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per day - so that pilot fatigue replac ed airfram e 
availability as the limiting factor. The Harriers 
were not six times better than the opposing aircraft; 
they were airbone six times as often. 25 
The Argentine Air Force ' s nearest mainland base was 400 miles 
away, so it could not fly as many sorties per aircraft per day 
as the British could . It is more a matter of the distances to 
be covered than anything else . Perhaps the Argentines could have 
averaged more sorties per aircraft per day than they did, but 
they would then have had the same problem of pilot fatigue unless 
they had a lot of spare pilots(pilots are so expensive to train 
that no air force has very large numbers of spare pilots available) . 
In the Au~tralian case , the ability to fly more sorties depends 
on where the enemy is , and the distances the RAAF's pilots might 
26 have to fly . 
(5) Surveillance Capability 
Surveillance capability is fundamentally important . P - 3 - C 
Orions , together with smaller coastal aircraft , are the best ones 
In this regard Australia has ever possessed . The rapid development 
of over - horizon radar , such as the Jindalee , and other electronic 
27 
systems should be added to them . 
In order to detect an intrusion in an early stage, it is 
necessary to maintain a i r defence radar networks around northern 
Australia " thus leaving no space uncovered . However, it is difficul t 
for ground radars alone to achieve early detection of enemy aircraft 
intruding at a n altitude lower than the line - of - sight , because 
radar signals proceed in straight lines , and do not follow the 
curvature of the earth . 28 For this purpose , the RAAF requires 
-42-
a special airborne radar early warning unit to detect aircraft 
intruding at low altitude. Because of the lack of shch a system, 
the British commander in the Falklands War had to deploy HMS 
~ 
Sheffield in a dangerously exposed position as forward radar picket 
where it could not be given aid protection due to the limited 
I ~( I 
range of the Sea Harriers . This led to her destruction. The absence 
t of an effective airborne early warning system also made possible 
Ii surprise attacks by the Argentinian Air Force on the British landings. 29 
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As repeated often, the threat to surface vessels at sea 
is becoming greater and greater . The best way to defend surface 
vessels is to destroy the carrying platforms before the missiles 
arelaunched . Therefore an early warning system against intruding 
aircraft also helps to defend Australia's frigates and patrol 
boats which are a part of the maritime strike forces. 
(6) Coastal Patrolling Cspability 
Comprehensive coastal patrolling at surface level is a 
vital function both i n relation to national interests and the 
enforcement of nationalluri sdiction in many aeras. There are various 
functions which navie s ca~ b e expected to perform in the offshore 
estate ; support of mi neral extra c tion , fishery protection duties, 
pollution control , law enforcement against errant merchant ships, 
smugglers and pirates, and search and rescue missions. 30 
It is sometimes argued that defence forces have better 
things to do than to conduct coastal patrols. 31 But navies have 
riL ~h~ 
ha,uome constabulary role in the past. In/19th century the Royal 
Navy spent much time suppressing piracy and slave trade and generally 
maintaining good order at sea , 32 while the US Coastguard was 
established by act of Congress in 1915 as a military service and 
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a branch of the armed forces of the United States. 33 Navies are 
likely to perform patrol duti e s offshore on an even greater scale 
In future , given the extention of offshore economic zones and 
of installations such as oil and gas platforms. 34 
In fact , some likely or foreseeable contingencies that 
could endanger Australia's interests in the future could happen 
in coastal reigons. Hence if there is a tendency within Australia's 
defence force to neglect constabulary functions , this should be 
questioned: 5Therefore: 
Attention should be given to the role that hovercraft 
or surface - effect ships can play both in coastal 
protection and surveillance and in support of other 
defence purposes generally . These vessels can operate 
now in a variety of sea condit l ons with speeds 
in excess of fifty knots ; they would also be excellent 
PGM platforms . Moreover, they require a smaller 
crew than conventional patrol boats and are 
virtually immune to all current types of min es 
and torpedoes - making them useful for mine c ounte r-
measures and related operations . 36 
Although coastal surveillance is one of the most impo rtant 
functions of navies , the execution of that role by civilian co mpan i e s 
on charter is an outstanding example of how to use the civil 
infrastructure in support of the defence forces . The benefits 
are , on the one hand , providing an economic stimulus for the civil 
industry , and on the other , a savi ng for the government . 3? At 
present the civilian role in this r egard is not large, but it 
is being increased . 38 As it wo uld b e difficult to locate a secret 
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landing of terro~ist groups and/or small special forces on Australia's 
long coast line, the chartering of civil infrastructure is very 
helpful, especially in the ability it provides to exploit the 
local knowledge of civilian aircrew. 
In recent times the boundary between terrorism and military 
operations has been becoming more and more vague. First, new 
technological developments have enhanced the capacities of terrorist 
groups. As Babbage says: 
Although national government will retain a clear 
superiority in conventional military power, the 
increasingly light and compact nature of guided 
firepower will provide stateless groups with a 
means of inflicting violence in a highly discriminating 
manner from stand-off ranges. Terrorist groups 
armed with modern anti - aircraft, anti-tank and 
anti-shipping weaponry will pose a threat of quite 
a different type to that of the past . 39 
Second, modern terroris ts tend to be supported by much bigger 
organizations. In the past t errorists were individuals acting 
alone or backed by small minori t y groups , but now they often belong 
to influential political gro ups whose existence their governments 
sometimes admit, and enjoy regional or worldwide infrastructural 
support from governments or from other terrorist organizations. 
The increased speed and prevalence of international travel has 
also facilitated terrorist mobility. 
This means terrorists can launch armed attacks on a hitherto 
unprecedented scale. As stated before , any attemptto attack and 
hold an area in the North certainly would be a multiple-division 
-45-
operation. However, in order merely to destroy a given military 
or industrial facility, 100 or fewer terrorists on a suicide mission 
might be enough. Thus terrorism is one of the most feasible and likely 
low.level contingencies. Unluckily deterrence is not so effective 
for terrorism, because a target of retaliation can usually not 
be specified. 
Although terrorists coming from abroad would be more likely 
to come in on commercial flights and obtain their weapons after 
that, some might plan to cross the surrounding water barrier, 
and special units, too. Therefore air, surface-and under-sea 
surveillance and patrolling of coastal regions are important. 40 
(7) Command, Control and Communication (C 3 ) 
A war is heavily dependent on command, control and communication 
(C 3 ). This means not only their roles in military operations but 
also those in c~vil/military coordination. Especially in low-level 
contingencies, which could occur at short notice, C3 are decisive. 
Kangaroo'83 showed this. 
The Australian defence forces do not have joint headquarters. 
Each time a joint operational force is formed, a joint headquarters 
should be established. Considering the possibility of a low-level 
threat developing in remote areas with relatively little warning 
time, serious consideration should be given to establishing a 
number of joint headquarters at suitable locations to cover such 
contingencies, for example, Perth, Darwin and Townsville. 41 
(8) Intelligence 
Intelligence - gathering and analyzing capacity is important, 
especially for low-level contingency. As low-level contingency 
needs just a change of intention, not of capability, it could 
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happen in a very short time. Australia needs a longer (even though 
not adequate) warning and lead time. 42 
It is clear that a country's national security interests 
do not always coincide with those of its allies. The intelligence-
dispensing country, such as the United States, might regulate 
or modify the flow of information in its own interests. Disinformation 
might be supplied either unintentionally or inte~t~onally. It 
must be anticipated that in addition to the flow of valuable objective 
information, foreign countries are likely to infiltrate their 
own value judgements, interests, philosophies and concepts into 
senior levels of the national security structure. Over an extended 
period of time, this influence could have a significant impact 
upon the attitudes and reactions of Australia's national security 
decision-makers . Further, in some types of situations, foreign 
sources of information could be suspended arbitarily or made the 
subject of bargaining pressures that wo uld not be in Australia's 
interests. 43 
A situation could arise where int elligence links with the 
United States might be too intima te . Whi le the Australian defence 
establishment benefits from Ameri can intelligence data, the United 
States also benefits from Australi a . Albinski says: 
United States personne l work closely with Australians 
at joint defence facilities, and the work of Australia's 
Defence Signals Directorate is of considerable 
value to American intelligence collecting organizations 
such as the National Security Agency.44 
This close relationship might lead to undue American interference 
in Australian affairs: 
... there have been various , documented examples 
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of CIA efforts to win over or to compromise groups 
or individuals in host countries, and of efforts 
to destabilize regimes . ... Allegation arose that 
American intelligence and security agencies, and 
especially CIA, engaged in improper and deceptive 
activity toward Australia during the period of 
the Whitlam government, particularly in its closing 
stages. 45 
Although this allegation has been denied officially by the US 
government,46 still this example shows that too close and intimate 
intelligence relations with the United States could be counterproductive 
and controversial. 
Hence too great a reliance upon foreign intelligence services 
lS far from desirable. Indeed only the United States and the Soviet 
Union will be able to afford a full range of sophisticated 
intelligence collection and analysis in the foreseeable future 
and it is useful to maintain intelligence relationships with one 
of them, but, at the same time, Australia should make aneffort 
to lessen its dependence on such intelligence. This requires an 
expansion of intelligence-gathering capabilities and a more 
sophisticated capacity for intelligence analysis and interpretation. 
The change of Australia's security strategy, from "Forward Defence" 
to "Defence of Australia", has a direct bearing on the nature 
of the task of its intelligence service. Much greater attention 
needs to be given to intelligence likely to be of specific 
significance to Australia. Most importantly, very close monitoring 
has to be maintained on all variables relating to pressure and 
threat lead and warning times. It would be upon the basis of detailed 
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material in this field that many important characteristics of 
Australia's response capacity could be determined. 47 
It should be remembered that democratic control over intelligence 
services is indispensable . Nowadays militarism is unlikely to 
be dominant in democratic countries such as Australia , Japan , 
New Zealand , Western Europe , the United States, and Canada . However, 
because of their bureaucratic procedures , their monopolization 
of information , and their intrinsic secrecy , intelligence services 
could become a strong obstacle to democracy . Therefore strict 
control that does not jeopardize the efficiency of intelligence 
services is neecssary . 
(9) Training 
Training is a determinant of a war , too . For example , pilot 
training has an enormous impact on the overall effectiveness of 
any tactical fighter force . Difference in pilot qualities are 
important in determining air combat outc ome s in situations where 
each adversary is using the same aircraf t . An official German 
report on World War II states : 
During the battle of France in 1940, groups of 
German Me 109 fighter ai rcraft frequently flew 
over Swiss territory . They were regularly intercepted 
by Swiss citizen pilots flying exactly the same 
aircraft - Me 109s . The rate of scoring was 7 to 
1 in favour of the Swiss ; not figures to be shrugged 
off as quite insignificant . 
Furthermore , the factor of pilot training is of such significance 
that it often overrides differences in aircraft performance and 
capabilities . 48 
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In the Vietnam War, most of the American pilots who were 
shot down by surface-to-air missiles had not exp erienced more 
than 9 sorties. The return rate of pilots who had experienced 
more than 9 sorties was high. 49 Therefore, it is essential that 
pilot training should be as realistic as possible. 
Pilot training is expensive. According to one RAND report, 
it is perhaps the most expensive educational process in the world. 50 
But cutting down of training flight hours might make the existence 
of 'expensive' aircraft meaningless. Pilots of the Soviet Air Force 
In the Far East undergo only 80 flight hours a year, while pilots 
of the US Air Force undergo more than 200 flight hours a year. 
In the shooting down of a KAL aircraft in September 1983, Soviet 
jets could not intercept the KAL aircraft crossing over Kamchatka 
Peninsula at an altitude of 10,000 m, in which radar can find 
aircraft relatively easily. At last one jet caught up with it 
only after it had passed Sakhalin Island. This fact suggests that 
the quality of Soviet pilots and their cooperation with radar 
sites are defective. 51 Appropriate pilot training is indispensable 
lest defence budget and resources should be wasted. 
(10) Civil-Military Relations 
The protection of civilians to the extent possible is 
indispensable in any operation. At Kangaroo'83, problems of target 
identification made it difficult to use helicopters or ground 
support aircraft to destroy Kamarian units. 52 Defence forces should 
never destroy civilians by mistake. At the battlefield of Okinawa 
in World War II, the Japanese Army, far from protecting citizens, 
slaughtered them. This memory has endured in the minds of the 
Okinaw~ people to this day, and consequently they have strong 
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feelings against the present Self Defence Forces. Soldiers by 
themselves cannot fight a war of any considerable magnitude or 
duration. Support of public opinion is indispensable: 
In World War II there were industrial strikes; 
and some trade union embargoes during the Vietnam 
War were such that Australian-based logistic support 
for the troops in Vietnam could only be guaranteed 
by using naval vessels and requisitioned vessels 
manned and loaded by military crews. 53 
Although defence of the home country is distinct from sending 
forces overseas, a war situation would be disadvantageous wit~out 
public support, especially as a considerable part of transportation 
would be dependent on the civil infrastructure. 
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CO NCLUSIO N 
As stated in this article, Australia has som e d e fence problems 
which will take a lot of time to solve . But no coun try ever has 
enough capacity, and it is never possible to say definitely how 
much is enough. Considering its advantageous strategic environment, 
we might well say Australia is relatively well off compared to 
most countries . 
Although its industrial and technological capacity is not 
great, Australia can endure against a low - level contingency. It 
is 70 % self - sufficient in oil , has ample minerals, including 
coal and natural gas , if necessary uranium also, and is considerably 
more than self - sufficient in agriculture. 1 Long before Australia 
can suffer seriously from a world crisis , steps would probably 
have been taken to resolve it , because of the great dependence 
of Japan and the western European countries on imported resources. 
This does not mean that Australia does not have to make an effort 
to advance industrial and technological capacity and to accumulate 
resources, but it is reasonably well placed to do so. 
As to the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Australia, 
it could safely be assumed that the Soviet Union would be more 
preoccupied with Western Europe, the Middle East, China, and Japan. 
For the defence of these areas, the US facilities in Australia 
would be a threat to the Soviet Union . In this situation a nuclear 
attack against Australia vlould be more likely than an invasion. 
However, Australia can do nothing against a nuclear attack other 
than cut its military relationship with the United States. The 
majority of Australians appear to prefer the maintenance of the 
alliance with the United States , and to accept this risk. This 
is Australia's choice , supported by governments on both sides 
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of politics. 
As a matter of probability, any military threat to Australia, 
against which Australia should prepare, would be only a low-level 
contingency, most likely posed by Indonesia. Other than Indonesia, 
no neighbouring country is capable of seriously threatening Australia, 
and even Indonesia has only a poor capacity to do so. 
The figures from "Military Balance 1983-1984" indicate 
that the local balance is advantageous to Australia, provided 
it does not undertake to invade Indonesia: 2 
Australia 
Total armed 72,473 
forces 
Estimated 
defence 
expenditure 
1982/3 
Defence 
expenditure 
as % of 
government 
spending 
1982 
Defence 
expenditure 
per capita 
1982 
Army 
Navy 
4.472 billion 
US dollars 
10.2 % 
299 US dollars 
32,850 
6 Oberon - class 
submarines 
3 ASW destroyers 
2 Guided missile 
frigates (FFG) 
6 River - class 
destroyer escorts 
Indonesia 
281,000 
2.926 
US dollars 
12.4 % 
19 US dollars 
210,000 
3 Submarines 
(1 for training) 
9 Frigates 
Air Force 
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11 Attack -class 
patrol boats 
9 Fremantle-class 
patrol boats 
On order 
2 FFG frigates 
6 Fremantle-class 
patrol boats 
Harpoon SSM 
2 Ground attack 
and reconnaisance 
squadrons (16 F-
111C, 4 F-111A, 
4 RF-111C) 
3 Interceptor and 
ground attack 
squadrons 
(56 Mirage III 0) 
2 Maritime 
reconnaisance 
squadrons 
(10 P-3B, 10 P-
3C) 
14 large patrol boats 
2 Ground attack 
squadrons (27 A-4E, 
4 TA-4H Skyhawk) 
2 Interceptor 
squadrons 
(11 F-5E, 4 F-5F) 
1 Maritime 
reconnaisance 
squadron 
( C-130H-MP, 1 Boeing 
737-200, 5 HU -16) 
Quality can override quantity. Besides excellence in quality of 
its armed forces , geographical location is advantageous to Australia 
also, i n that the vital centres of Indonesia are close to Australia's 
military facilities , but the vital centres of Australia are far 
from Indonesia 's nearest air bases. 
Indonesia could bomb or mine some area of the North , but 
in turn Australia could do the same thing to main Indonesian 
ports much more easily and with a much greater effect. Such a 
strategic asymmetry makes the situation more disadvantageous to 
Indonesia, in that the more Indonesia escalates a conflict, the 
more options Australia would have for using its more sophisticated 
military technology. Hence if a conflict were to occur between 
Australia and Indonesia, the latter would have the moreincentives 
to keep the level of conflict as low as possible. 
c: 
- ..J f. -
At present relations between Australia and Indonesia are 
not bad enough for the development of a military conflict to seem 
at all likely. It could, however, be a consequence of excessive 
Indonesian pressure against PNG; although there is no formal defence 
~ 
agreement, Australia has/special responsibility for PNG historically 
and geographically. 
Australia's deterrence and actual war fighting capabilities 
coincide to a remarkable degree. As we have seen, any country 
wishing to invade Australia would find it difficult even to attempt 
low-level harrassment. Compared to other powers in its region, 
Australia has a better geographical situation and more sophisticated 
defence forces for mine warfare, anti-surface vessel strikes and 
fighting capabilities. 
However, unless Australia's mainland or off-shore islands 
were to be attacked, it might be politically difficult to bomb 
or mine Indonesia, because such an action could escalate and widen 
the conflict. In other words, Australia's ability to defend itself 
or to attack Indonesia provides deterrence against, for example , 
an invasion of PNG, but not necessarily actual war fighting capabilities 
for the direct defence of PNG if deterrence fails. 
Then, should Australia build up its ability to defen d PNG? 
This is the dilemma which military planners confront. If Australia 
develops its actual war fighting capabilities further, it might 
be a signal to Indonesia that Australia would wish to keep a 
contingency as low as possible, and therefore would not escalate 
conflict by attacking Indonesia. This is the same logic as the 
anxiety that building up of NATO conventional forces might encourage 
the Soviet Union to invade Western Europe without worrying about 
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a possible nuclear response by NATO. 
The answer to this question is to be found in the width 
of Australia. As most of the Army focus on the East, it is necessary 
to be able to transport them everywhere within the country, and 
such a transportation capability would be adequate for defence 
of PNG also. If Australian Defence Forces can carry troops and 
supplies from the East to the North , why not from North to PNG? 
No additional specialised equipment is required for defence of 
PNG, and there probably would not be much need for heavy equipments 
such as tanks or armoured personnel carriers. The most important 
factor required for defence of PNG is a transportation capability 
for troops and light equipment up to and including hand - held anti-
tank and anti-aircraft missiles. A military exercise to send troops 
and supplies to the North is useful as a rehearsal for sending 
them to PNG, so war fighting capability for that theatTe can to 
a large extent be exercised without necessarily encouraging Indonesia 
towards a belief that Australia would wish to keep a conflict 
at the low-level possible. The t ransportation range covered by 
Kangaroo'83, for example, was mu ch larger than the distance between 
Eastern Australia and PNG. 
Australia's relatively s mall ground forces could have only 
limited military effect, but considerable political effect. Preemptive 
deployment of Australian forces would be a great deterrence if 
Indonesia contemplated invasion of PNG. Australian naval and air 
capabilities could be used either as direct combat support or 
to cut Indonesian lines of communication to Irian Jaya and the 
border area. 
However, as Indonesia's frustration is caused by an 
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uncontrolled dissident movement within Irian Jaya which uses PNG 
as a "sanctuary", it is a prerequisite for Australia to persuade 
~ 
PNG to take~firm policy toward dissident groups and, if necessary, 
to cooperate with PNG. 
Another matter which might develop to a conflict between 
Australia and Indonesia concerns natural resources at sea. The 
two countries have adjoining Exclusive Economic Zones the boundaries 
of which are in dispute in some areas. At present neither is exploiting 
the disputed areas, but there could be some ,possibility of future 
conflict, should either or both discover sugnificant natural resources 
such as oil or natural gas: In this case too, a peaceful settlement 
lS desirable. 
Political solutions are preferable to military ones. Defence 
preparation is very important but supplementary to politics. 
Australia should attempt to retain the support of Asia-Pacific 
countries, because it is one of them, and deterring war is preferable 
even to winning it. 
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